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Recent patterns of global production 
and GVC participation
Xin Li (Beijing Normal University), Bo Meng (IDE-JETRO), and Zhi Wang (RCGVC-UIBE)
ABSTRACT
Taking advantage of a new accounting method to decom-
pose GDP production into pure domestic production, tra-
ditional trade, simple and complex GVC activities, this 
chapter examines recent trends in global value chain (GVC) 
activities across the world. Our main findings show that the 
pace of GVC activities picked up in 2017 after a period of 
slow down since 2012; intra-North American and intra-Euro-
pean GVC activities declined relative to inter-regional trans-
actions due to higher penetration via Factory Asia but value 
chains still remain largely regional; China is increasingly 
playing an important role as both a supply and demand hub 
in traditional trade and simple GVC networks, although the 
US and Germany are still the most important hubs in com-
plex GVC networks; bilateral trade balances are significantly 
affected by the supply and demand of third countries; and 
net imports are no longer a proper measure of the impact 
of international trade on the domestic economy in the age 
of GVCs.
• The growth of global value chains has slowed since the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis but has not 
stopped. From 2000 to 2007, global value chains (GVCs), especially complex ones, expanded at a 
faster rate than GDP. During the global financial crisis there was naturally some retrenchment of 
GVCs, followed by quick recovery (2010-2011), but since then growth has mostly slowed. However, 
most recent data for 2017 show that complex GVCs grew faster than GDP.
• Value chains remain largely regional but they are not static. Between 2000 and 2017, intra-regional 
GVC trade increased in “Factory Asia” reflecting, in part, upgrading by China and other Asian 
economies. In contrast, intra-regional GVC trade in “Factory Europe” and “Factory North America” 
decreased slightly relative to inter-regional GVC trade reflecting stronger linkages with “Factory 
Asia”.
• China has emerged as an important hub in traditional trade and simple GVC networks, but the 
United States and Germany remain the most important hubs in complex GVC networks.
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Global value chains, where firms specialize in a particu-lar set of activities in one country to produce parts and components for other countries, have spread the pro-duction process across countries; their share of world 
production and trade has expanded greatly over the past three 
decades. In the years immediately after the global financial crisis, 
however, the expansion of GVCs significantly slowed, according 
to GVC production measures reported in the 2017 GVC develop-
ment report. At the same time, the world has seen the emergence 
of populist, protectionist movements in many advanced countries. 
The looming trade tension between the United States and its 
major trading partners, especially China, the second largest econ-
omy in the world, will have significant consequences for growth 
opportunities in developing countries, but also, in a world of high 
levels of interdependence, developed economies.
The first chapter of this report updates trends in GVC pro-
duction and trade activities in both developed and developing 
economies by technology (knowledge) intensity and income 
level, according to the production decomposition method pro-
posed by Wang et al (2017). This approach classifies the embod-
ied factor content in a product into GVC and non-GVC activities 
based on whether it crosses national borders or not. Value-added 
creation is only classified as a GVC activity when the embodied 
factor content in a product crosses a national border for produc-
tion purposes (Box 1.1).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes 
the changing pattern of global production activities and GVC 
participation across countries and industries based on global 
inter-country input-output (ICIO) tables constructed by Asian 
Development Bank, which covers 62 economies and 35 indus-
tries up to 2017. Section 2 demonstrates the changing distribu-
tion of value-added production activities along typical global 
value chains, as more developing countries have been integrated 
into the global production network. Section 3 uses network 
analysis to demonstrate the topology of the global production 
network structure of traditional trade, simple and complex GVC 
activities, and their evolution between 2000 and 2017. Section 4 
analyzes the multilateral nature of bilateral trade and focuses on 
three sensitive bilateral trade relations (US-China, US-Germany, 
US-Japan) to demonstrate the roles third countries have played 
in determining bilateral trade balances in the age of global value 
chains. Section 5 concludes.
BOX 1.1
A production decomposition to identify and measure GVC activities
In Wang et. al. (2017), production activities are divided into 
4 broad types depending on whether they involve produc-
tion sharing between two or more countries. The first type 
is value added produced at home and absorbed by domes-
tic final demand without involving international trade. No 
factor content crosses national borders in the entire produc-
tion and consumption process. The second type is domestic 
value added embodied in final product exports, that is, tra-
ditional trade: products are made completely by domestic 
factors and factor content crosses a national border once 
for consumption only. The third type is domestic value 
added embodied in a country-sector’s intermediate trade 
that is used by the partner country to produce its domestic 
products consumed locally, or is foreign value added that 
is imported directly from partner countries and used for 
domestically consumed products. Factor content is used in 
production outside the home country and crosses a national 
border once for production. Therefore, it is referred to 
as “simple GVC activities”. The last type is value added 
embodied in intermediate exports/imports that is used 
by a partner country to produce exports (intermediate or 
final) for other countries. In this case, factor content crosses 
a national border at least twice, so is referred to as “com-
plex GVC activities.” Production activities in the first two 
types are entirely conducted within national borders, and 
there is no cross-country production sharing; the difference 
between the two is whether they satisfy either domestic or 
foreign final demand. The last two types are cross-country 
production sharing activities; the differences between the 
two are whether they satisfy partner country or other coun-
tries’ final demand, and the number of times factor content 
crosses national borders. Domestic and import input-output 
coefficient matrixes in ICIO tables are used to distinguish 
domestic and foreign factor content in various production 
activities. The classification and relation among the four 
types of production are depicted in Figure 1.1.
According to this decomposition method, GVC activities 
as a share of total production activities can be used to mea-
sure the intensity of each country-sector’s participation in 
cross-country production sharing activities. Essentially, this 
approach measures the percentage of production in a par-
ticular country-sector that has been engaged in global pro-
duction networks. The forward GVC participation indicator 
is based on a decomposition of GDP production; it shows 
the percentage of production factors employed in a coun-
try-sector that have been involved in cross-country produc-
tion sharing activities. The backward participation indicator 
is computed based on a decomposition of final goods pro-
duction; it shows the percentage of final products produced 
by a country-sector coming from GVC activities.
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1. The changing pattern of global production 
activities and GVC participation2
GVC activities as a share of global GDP fell from 2011 to 2016, 
as the share of purely domestic production activities rose (see 
Figure 1.2, which is an update of Figure 2.3 in the 2017 GVC 
Development Report based on the newly released ICIO tables 
by the Asian Development Bank). This continues the downward 
trend in GVC activities shown in the 2017 GVC report based 
on data through 2014. However, the growth of global trade 
surpassed the growth of global GDP for the first time in nearly 
six years in 2017, and there were signs of a recovery of GVC 
activities. 
The nominal growth rate of all types of production activi-
ties (the four activities are defined in Box 1.1) fell sharply during 
2012-2016, with a much sharp slowdown in cross-country, pro-
duction-sharing GVC activities. The decline was the steepest for 
complex GVC activities, followed by simple GVC activities, tra-
ditional trade and domestic production activities; the average 
annual changes for these four types of activities during 2012-
2016 were -1.65%, -1.00%, -0.28% and 1.49% respectively (indi-
vidual year data are reported in Figure 1.3, which is an update 
of Figure 2.5 in the 2017 GVC report). Thus, the limited increase 
in global GDP from 2012-2016 was almost entirely accounted 
by the growth of pure domestic production; international trade 
contributed very little during this slow recovery period. In 2017, 
the growth rate of global trade exceeded that of global GDP, a 
10% increase in complex GVC activities led the growth. However, 
rising trade tensions between the United States and its major 
trading partners, especially China, has introduced tremendous 
uncertainty in the global economy recovery process. Determin-
ing whether the recovery of cross-country production sharing 
activities in 2017 has started a new trend requires more years of 
data and further analysis.
A first step is to measure the impact of the recent, sharp 
changes in commodity prices on nominal growth rates of pro-
duction activities shown above. The global prices of crude oil 
and other bulk commodities have gone through a “super circle” 
since 2000. For example, the per barrel crude oil price (dated 
Brent) fluctuated dramatically during 2000-2018, rising from less 
than 30 US dollars in 2000 to over 110 dollars in 2011, falling to 
less than 50 dollars by 2016, and then rebounding to about 70 
dollars since early in 2018. Because crude oil and other bulk com-
modities are important intermediate inputs in global production, 
these price fluctuations may affect the relative nominal growth 
patterns of different types of value-added creation activities 
measured in current US dollars shown in Figure 1.3. 
It appears, however, that the more rapid decline in the nom-
inal value of GVCs than other activities as a share of GDP from 
2011-2016 was not due simply to price changes. Figure 1.4 shows 
the growth rate of the volume of world merchandise trade, world 
real GDP and their ratio during 1995-2017. For each year when 
global real trade growth was faster than global real GDP growth, 
complex GVC activities had the highest nominal rate of growth 
FIGURE 1.1 Decomposition of production activities1
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FIGURE 1.2 Trends in production activities as a share of global GDP, by type of value-added creation activity, 1995-2017 
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FIGURE 1.3 Nominal growth rates of different value added creation activities, global level, 2000-2017
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among the four type activities shown in Figure 1.3. And when 
world trade grew slower than world GDP, complex GVC activi-
ties grew more slowly than other activities. This can be under-
stood intuitively, because complex GVC activities are the only 
one of these four components of value added production where 
factor content embedded in products cross a national border at 
least twice. When complex GVC activities grow slower than pure 
domestic production activities, as happened during 2012-2016, 
world trade grows slower than GDP. 
To evaluate the impact of the shift in production patterns 
after the global financial crisis to GVC participation across coun-
tries and industries, we plot the forward and backward GVC par-
ticipation indicators jointly in a scatterplot based on ADB ICIO 
tables (Figure 1.5). The two red dotted lines indicate the world’s 
average forward and backward participation rates and divide 
the figure into four quadrants. Most countries fall along the 
45-degree line, indicating that countries that have a high degree 
of forward participation also tend to have a high degree of back-
ward participation. Major resource exporters, such as Mongolia, 
Russia and Norway, fall above the 45-degree line (Figure 1.5, 
upper left). Since natural resources are the most upstream sec-
tors, these economies tend to have much higher degree of for-
ward GVC participation than backward GVC participation.
Across sectors3, mining (represented by the purple dots) is in 
the upper left corner, indicating a high degree of forward GVC 
participation but a low degree of backward GVC participation. 
Most service sectors, especially for sectors in the other services 
group (utility, education, health care and personal services, rep-
resented by the blue dots) tend to be in the lower left corner, 
meaning that they have low participation in GVC activities by 
both measures. In comparison, high research and development 
(R&D) intensity manufacturing sectors (red dots) tend to be in the 
upper right quarter of the graph, reflecting their active partic-
ipation in GVCs as both producers and buyers of intermediate 
products.
Ten years after the global financial crisis, global GVC partic-
ipation has not returned to pre-crisis levels: the global average 
GVC participation rate (as a share of GDP) was 0.1289 in 2017, 
compared to 0.1343 in 2007. GVC activities recovered faster in 
high-income countries than in middle-income countries. The 
recovery of specific GVC activities (backward versus forward par-
ticipation) also differs across income groups. Forward GVC par-
ticipation increased more rapidly than backward participation in 
the high-income countries, especially in the high-income Eastern 
European countries (the forward participation rate of the Czech 
Republic rose from 0.2355 in 2007 to 0.2812 in 2017, of Estonia 
FIGURE 1.4 The growth rate of merchandise trade volume and real global GDP, 1995-2017, %
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from 0.2536 to 0.3151, of Hungary from 0.2298 to 0.2777, and of 
Latvia from 0.1818 to 0.2712). A higher growth rate of forward 
participation in manufacturing and service sectors often implies 
faster upgrade of GVC production activities4 as well as the deep-
ening of intra-product specialization brought about by the recov-
ery of cross-country production sharing activities. At the same 
time, some middle-income economies such as Mexico, Romania 
and Viet Nam moved up faster in backward participation, which 
mirrors what happened in developed countries. Finally, some 
Asian developing economies that experienced a decline in both 
forward and backward GVC participation have not yet seen a 
return to pre-crisis levels. For instance, India’s forward and back-
ward participation rate dropped from 0.1006 and 0.1382 in 2007 
to 0.0655 and 0.0991in 2017, respectively. China, Indonesia and 
Philippines also were subjected to similar declines.
Comparing the development of different GVC activities in dif-
ferent income groups in longer period, significant growth of GVC 
participation only occurred in high-income countries. In partic-
ular, their forward GVC participation rate increased from 9.5 in 
2000 to 12.7 in 2017, while simple and complex activities con-
tributed approximately equal shares (Table 1.1). The GVC partic-
ipation rate actually declined in upper middle income countries. 
FIGURE 1.5 GVC participation indicators, country levels and sector levels
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This is because participation in cross-border production sharing 
is only one kind of division of labor that can contribute to indus-
trialization. The substitution of imported intermediate inputs by 
domestically-produced intermediate inputs in advanced devel-
oping economies, such as the industrial upgrading in China, 
may also reduce the intensity of GVC participation due to the 
deepening of domestic division of labor and the lengthening of 
domestic value chains. The proper combination of cross-border 
and domestic value chains, or domestic and foreign factor con-
tent in a particular product, should be determined by market 
forces (this issue is examined in detail in Chapter 7).
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis had a dramatic, nega-
tive impact on GVC participation for all countries in the world 
(Figure 1.6). The GVC participation rate increased by 4.3% per 
TABLE 1.1A Forward GVC participation indexes by country groups
(Percent of GDP)
Income level
GVC participation Simple GVC Complex GVC
2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
High 9.5 11.8 12.4 5.6 6.8 7.1 3.8 5.0 5.3
Upper middle 11.4 14.1 10.5 7.2 8.4 6.4 4.2 5.6 4.2
Lower middle 10.8 12.4 9.1 6.9 7.6 5.7 3.9 4.8 3.4
TABLE 1.1B Backward GVC participation indexes by country groups
(percent of final goods production)
Income level
GVC participation Simple GVC Complex GVC
2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
High 9.3 11.7 11.8 5.8 6.8 6.5 3.5 4.9 5.3
Upper middle 12.5 14.1 10.5 7.3 7.7 6.3 5.2 6.4 4.2
Lower middle 11.7 14.2 11.8 7.9 9.3 7.6 3.8 4.8 4.2
 Source: the UIBE GVC indexes derived from the ADB 2018 ICIO tables.
FIGURE 1.6 The changing intensity of GVC participation by income groups, 1995-2017
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year during the pre-crisis GVC expansion period (2000-2008). 
This rate declined by 14.9% during the crisis in 2009, but recov-
ered by 9.0% during 2010-2011. However, the world average GVC 
participation rate declined by 1.6% per year with the sharp slow-
down of global trade from 2012 on, mainly driven by middle-in-
come countries (the complex GVC participation rate of high-in-
come countries was higher in 2017 than in 2007). In particular, the 
GVC participation rate of the lower middle-income and upper 
middle-income groups in 2017 was still approximately 2.6 and 3.7 
percentage points lower than their participation rate in 2007.
According to the table 1.2a and table 1.2b, the participation 
rates of most industry groups are still lower than their pre-cri-
sis levels, especially for all the goods producing industries. 
The tables also indicate that the complex GVC activities rate 
increased more (or declined more) than did the simple GVC 
activities rate in most industry groups, indicating complex GVC 
activities are more sensitive to external economic shocks.
Analysis over a longer period shows that GVC activities of all 
sectors increased from 2000 to 2017. The higher the technol-
ogy (knowledge) intensity of the sector, the larger the increase 
in complex GVC activities. For instance, the forward GVC par-
ticipation rate of the high, middle and low technology-intensive 
manufacturing sectors increased by 4.2, 3.8 and 3.2 percentage 
points during 2000 to 2017. Complex GVC activities contributed 
58.1% of these increases, on average, with a particularly high 
contribution (76.4%) to the 4.2 percentage point increase of 
the GVC participation rate in the high-tech sector. The forward/
backward GVC participation rates in the business and financial 
services sector, which also is relatively knowledge intensive, 
also increased from 10.7/5.8 to 15.2/9.4, respectively (Table 1.2). 
TABLE 1.2B Backward GVC participation indexes by industry groups
(percent of final goods production)
Sector level
GVC participation Simple GVC Complex GVC
2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
High Tech 22.3 28.8 26.8 8.4 9.8 9.6 13.9 19.0 17.3
Middle Tech 19.1 26.9 25.9 10.0 14.4 13.2 9.1 12.5 12.7
Low tech 16.6 21.8 20.5 9.9 11.7 10.5 6.7 10.1 10.0
Business & financial 5.8 8.7 9.4 4.2 5.7 5.9 1.7 2.9 3.6
Trade and transportation 7.1 10.3 10.4 4.9 6.8 6.7 2.2 3.4 3.7
Other services 6.9 10.2 10.0 5.3 7.6 7.3 1.6 2.5 2.6
Agriculture 8.4 11.3 9.6 5.7 7.5 6.2 2.7 3.8 3.4
Mining 10.2 12.1 11.4 6.5 6.1 7.6 3.7 5.9 3.8
Source: the UIBE GVC indexes derived from the ADB 2018 ICIO tables.
TABLE 1.2A Forward GVC participation indexes by industry groups
(percent of value added)
Sector level
GVC participation Simple GVC Complex GVC
2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
High Tech 25.3 30.7 28.8 13.8 16.1 15.6 11.5 14.6 13.2
Middle Tech 22.5 21.6 23.7 14.5 16.4 14.7 8.0 9.7 9.1
Low tech 12.4 15.8 15.3 7.9 9.9 9.5 4.5 5.9 5.8
Business & financial 10.7 14.9 15.2 6.6 9.1 9.0 4.0 5.8 6.2
Trade and transportation 10.2 13.4 13.4 6.2 7.9 8.0 4.0 5.5 5.4
Other services 2.3 3.5 3.3 1.4 2.1 2.0 0.9 1.4 1.3
Agriculture 8.3 11.4 10.6 5.8 7.8 7.2 2.4 3.6 3.5
Mining 39.9 54.3 48.3 25.6 34.5 29.6 14.3 19.8 18.8
Source: the UIBE GVC indexes derived from the ADB 2018 ICIO tables.
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Higher GVC intensity in the high-tech, knowledge intensive sec-
tors in part reflects the role of GVCs in the dissemination of tech-
nology from the lead firms to their suppliers (Rodrik, D., 2018). 
The high intensity of complex GVC activities in high-tech 
sectors indicates R&D and other technology inputs have pro-
moted intra-product specialization and the extension of global 
production networks. Slicing the production process into differ-
ent tasks has greatly extended the depth and scope of interna-
tional exchange and division of labor, from between products to 
between stages of the production of individual products, thus 
generating new sources of comparative advantage for interna-
tional exchange. The organization of production based on tasks 
by multinational enterprises, in which parts and components of 
special products (such as computers, automobiles and airplanes) 
cross national borders several times (complex GVC activities) 
is the fundamental force that drove global trade growth faster 
than global GDP growth before the global financial crisis. It 
also provided new opportunities for developing countries to be 
integrated into global economy by specializing in some simple 
tasks in which they have a comparative advantage, thus enabling 
FIGURE 1.7 GVC participation indicators by countries and sectors, 2007 and 2017, manufactures 
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FIGURE 1.8 GVC participation indicators by countries and sectors, 2007 and 2017, services
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developing countries to achieve rapid industrialization through 
joining GVCs. 
Generally speaking, industry groups in manufactures have 
higher average GVC participation intensity than industry groups 
in mining and services (see the scatter plots of backward and 
forward participation rates across countries—Figures 1.7, 1.8 
and 1.9). In the mining sector, which is the main source of raw 
materials input in the early stages of production, the forward 
participation ratio is generally higher than backward participa-
tion for most countries, while in other services (utilities, educa-
tion, health care and domestic services), which are closer to the 
final consumer and placed at the final stage of the production 
chain, the backward participation is higher than forward par-
ticipation for most countries. In manufactures, higher R&D and 
knowledge intensities are associated with a higher GVC partic-
ipation rate (see above). In services, GVC participation is also 
heterogeneous across industries. Communication, financial and 
business services, as well as trade and transportation services, 
have much higher GVC participation rates than other domestic 
services such as education, health care and personal services, 
because the former are critical inputs in the modern production 
process. 
GVC participation rates also differ significantly by geo-
graphic region5. Figures 1.10-1.12 report both forward and back-
ward GVC participation intensities and their inter- and intra-re-
gional shares for manufacture industries in the three major 
supply chain blocks (North America, Europe and Asia). In each 
figure, the very last pair of columns are the GVC participation 
rates in levels and the previous columns are the decomposition 
across regions. For example, in Figure 1.10, which pertains to 
Asia, the bar for Asia shows the share of intra-regional activities 
in Asia’s total GVC participation, while the other bars show the 
FIGURE 1.9 GVC participation indicators by countries and sectors, 2007 and 2017, agriculture and mining
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participation of other regions in Asian GVCs, either as suppliers 
(backward linkages for Asia) or purchasers (forward linkages for 
Asia). The light- and dark-colored portions of the bar show the 
shares of different groups inside the region (the light-colored 
portions represent East Asia and Western Europe, and the dark 
color portions represent the Rest of Asia and Eastern Europe).
Generally speaking, the higher the degree of economic inte-
gration in a regional production network, the higher the intra-re-
gional GVC activities. In 2000, “Factory Europe” had the highest 
degree of economic integration, so its share of intra-regional 
GVC activities is the highest among the 3 regional production 
networks; North America ranks second and Asia third. However, 
ten years after the financial crisis, along with the rising scale of 
the regional economy, the share of intra-regional GVC activities 
in “Factory Asia” exceeded that of “Factory North America”, 
especially in complex GVC participation. In contrast, the share 
of intra-regional GVC activities has declined in both “Factory 
Europe” and “Factory North America” and their share of inter-re-
gional production sharing activities has increased, especially 
their GVC linkage with “Factory Asia”.
In “Factory Asia”, the increase of cross-country production 
sharing activities in the last decade was led by intra-regional 
complex GVC activities. This share increased from 38.5%/39.6% 
of Asia’s total forward/backward complex GVC activities in 
2000 to 43.9%/46.2% in 2017. Another notable development 
was the market-driven enlargement of “Factory Asia”, as more 
Asian lower middle-income countries were integrated into 
Asian production network during this period. In the “Rest of 
Asia”, the shares of forward and backward GVC activities rose 
from 10.2% to 11.8% and from 16.6% to 19.4%, respectively. 
However, the importance of North America and Europe as 
both destinations of Asia’s GVC exports (Figure 1.10, forward 
GVC activities) and sources of Asia’s GVC imports (Figure 1.10, 
backward GVC activities) has declined.
In Europe, the decline in complex GVC activities represent-
ing the breadth of regional production linkages is much more 
than that of simple GVC activities. In particular, the share of 
intra-regional complex forward GVC participation decreased 
by 6.7 percentage points in the last decade, from 47.6% to 
40.9%, and intra-regional backward complex cross-border 
FIGURE 1.10 Forward and backward (simple/complex) GVC participation, share of intra-and inter-regional GVC activities 
in manufacturing, (%), 2000 and 2017, Asia 
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production sharing activities fell by more than 8 percent-
age points, from 41.1% to 33.0%. This was mainly due to the 
relative decline of intra-regional GVC linkages in Western 
Europe, since this share in Eastern Europe increased during 
this period. The shares of inter-regional production sharing 
activities between Europe and Asia and Rest of the World also 
increased; the manufacturing links between Europe and Asia 
are more reflected in the complex GVC activities, and the man-
ufacturing links with Rest of World are more reflected in the 
simple GVC activities. For instance, the share of Asia as the 
destination of Europe’s complex GVC exports and the share 
of Asia as the source of Europe’s complex GVC imports both 
increased by over 4 percentage points, from 12.9% to 17.3% 
and 12.3% to 16.6%, respectively. East Asia contributed 79.9% 
and 81.4% of these changes, respectively. The share of Rest of 
the World as the destination of Europe’s simple GVC exports 
and as the source of Europe’s simple GVC imports increased 
from 12.1% to 20.8% and 15.0% to 25.0%, respectively during 
this period.
In North America, the share of intra-regional complex GVC 
activities in forward/backward linkages fell by 6.7% and 8.1% 
from 2000 to 2017, respectively, although the share of intra-re-
gional simple GVC activities changed slightly. The concomitant 
rise in the share of inter-regional complex activities reflects the 
more globalized supply chains in North America today compared 
to 17 years ago (recall that complex GVC activities involves prod-
ucts that cross national borders at least twice, which has been 
the most important driving force behind globalization). More-
over, the development is not only reflected in the manufacturing 
sectors, but also in services sectors. For instance, in telecommu-
nication, financial and business services, North America’s share 
of both GVC exports to and GVC imports from Asia and Europe 
exceeded its share of intra-regional GVC activities in 2017, par-
ticularly for complex GVC activities.6 This reflects the intensive 
outsourcing of services from the United States to Asian countries 
(such as India and Philippines), and the tightly linked financial and 
business service supply chain activities between North America 
and Europe.
FIGURE 1.11 Forward and backward (simple/complex) GVC participation, share of intra-and inter-regional GVC activities 
in manufacturing, (%), 2000 and 2017, Europe 
Simple forward GVC activities in manufacturing
Simple backward GVC activities in manufacturing
Complex forward GVC activities in manufacturing
Complex backward GVC activities in manufacturing
2000 2017
Asia EU NAFTA ROW Simple 
GVCPt_F
10.2
62.4
15.3
12.1
16.616.4
50.0
12.9
20.8 19.7
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
The rest 
of Asia
East Asia
Western EU
Eastern EU
12.9
62.5
12.8 11.8 12.6
17.3
59.6
9.7
13.3
18.9
The rest 
of Asia
East Asia
Western EU
Eastern EU
Asia EU NAFTA ROW Simple 
GVCPt_B
9.7
60.0
15.3 15.0
11.2
16.2
46.3
12.5
25.0
11.8
The rest 
of Asia
East Asia
Western EU
Eastern EU 2000 2017
12.3
63.6
10.7 13.3
15.116.6
64.6
Asia EU NAFTA ROW Complex
GVCPt_B
Asia EU NAFTA ROW Complex
GVCPt_F
7.4
11.5
23.1
The rest 
of Asia
East Asia
Western EU
Eastern EU
Note: the last set of bars represent the overall GVC participation ratios for Europe. 
Source: the UIBE GVC indexes derived from the ADB 2018 ICIO tables.
22 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
2. The changing distribution of value-added 
along typical GVCs7
This section uses “smile curve” analysis to discuss how the distri-
bution of value added across countries and industries via GVCs 
changes when more and more developing countries are partici-
pating in global production networks. 
The concept of the smile curve was first proposed around 
1992 by Stan Shih, the founder of Acer, a technology company 
headquartered in Chinese Taipei (Shih 1996). In the personal 
computer industry, Shih observed that both ends of the value 
chain bring higher value added to the product than the middle 
part. In business management theory, the smile curve is a graph-
ical depiction of how value added varies across the different 
stages of bringing a product to the market in a manufacturing 
industry. The logic of the smile curve has been widely used in 
case studies of individual firms, but rarely identified, measured, 
and evaluated at the country level by using real data with explicit 
consideration of GVCs. As we show in the 2017 GVC Develop-
ment Report, by borrowing the image of the smile curve and con-
sistently measuring both the value-added gains from GVC par-
ticipation and the distance between producers and consumers 
through a recently-developed input-output based methodology 
(see Ye, Meng et.al., 2015; Meng, Ye et.al., 2017), the relationship 
between value-added distribution and GVC participation can be 
empirically identified and drawn for various GVCs.8
In Figures 1.13 and 1.14, we take the final goods exports of 
Mexico’s ICT industry and Japan’s auto industry as examples. 
The y-axis of these figures shows compensation per employee 
(a proxy for technology level or a first-order approximation of 
labor productivity)9 in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, and the x-axis 
denotes distance showing how far a specific participating coun-
try and industry pair in the particular GVC of interest is away from 
global consumers.10 The data used is from the WIOD (2016 ver-
sion), which covers 43 economies and 56 industries over 15 years 
(2000-2014), with the total number of GVC participants (43 × 56 
= 2,408) represented as circles in these figures. The size of the 
circle represents the absolute value added created by joining the 
corresponding GVC (the minimum threshold for inclusion in the 
figure is 0.1% of the total value-added gain measured in million 
U.S. dollars). The smooth line is fitted by local polynomial regres-
sion–smoothing weighted by its value-added volume, and the 
shadowed area represents the confidence interval around the 
smooth line. Using the estimated smile curve can enhance our 
FIGURE 1.12 Forward and backward (simple/complex) GVC participation, share of intra-and inter regional GVC activities 
in manufacturing, (%) 2000 and 2017, North America
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FIGURE 1.13 Mexico’s ICT final goods exports related value chain, 2000 and 2014
Note: y-axis represents the compensation per employee in constant thousand U.S. dollars (base year: 2000); the x-axis represents the length of the correspond-
ing production chain in average stages of production.
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FIGURE 1.14 Japan’s auto final goods exports related value chain, 2000 and 2014
Note: -axis represents the compensation per employee in constant thousand U.S. dollars (base year: 2000); the x-axis represents the length of the corresponding 
production chain in average stages of production.
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understanding of the participants (countries and industries) of a 
specific GVC as well as their positions and economic gains from 
the chain. 
The plotted GVC for Mexico’s ICT (MEX17) final goods exports 
to the world market in 2000 clearly appears as a smile curve (see 
Figure 1.13). The main participants in the pre-fabrication stages 
(upstream) of this value chain comprise many US industries, such 
as ICT (USA17), wholesale trade (USA29), legal accounting, head 
offices, management consultancy activities (USA45), electrical 
equipment (USA18), fabricated metal products (USA16), machin-
ery and equipment n.e.c. (USA19), and chemicals (USA11); some 
Mexican domestic industries, such as chemicals (MEX11), machin-
ery and equipment n.e.c. (MEX19), electrical equipment (MEX18); 
and several Japanese industries such as ICT (JPN17), basic metals 
(JPN15), and fabricated metal products (JPN16). The main partic-
ipants in the post-fabrication stages (downstream) comprise US 
industries such as wholesale trade (USA29), retail trade (USA30), 
warehousing (USA34) and so on. Most participating industries 
upstream and downstream in Mexico’s ICT exports-related value 
chain are from the US and Japan, countries with high levels of 
labor compensation, while most participating industries in the 
middle of the value chain are from the Mexico’s domestic indus-
tries with low levels of labor compensation. Therefore, the whole 
chain naturally appears as a smile curve.
However, the shape of the curve changed significantly in 2014, 
from a smile curve to a kind of “W” curve. At least three fac-
tors contributed to the remarkable changes in the shape of this 
smile curve. One was the rapidly increasing presence of Chinese 
industries in Mexico’s value chain upstream. As seen in 2014, 
many Chinese industries with low compensation per employee, 
such as ICT (CHN17), wholesale trade (CHN29), mining (CHN4), 
electrical equipment (CHN18), machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
(CHN19), and basic metals (CHN15), replaced other countries’ 
positions in the Mexican value chain. Those Chinese industries 
became some of the main players, with a large value-added gain 
in the pre-fabrication stage of this value chain. This reflects the 
fact that producing ICT exports in Mexico used more Chinese 
intermediate inputs directly and indirectly. The second factor 
was the rapid technological upgrades that occurred in the US 
ICT industry (USA17), indicated by the simultaneous increase in 
compensation per employee and maintenance of a large volume 
of value-added gain. This implies that Mexico’s ICT produc-
tion was highly dependent on high-tech US intermediates. The 
third factor was the increasing volume of value-added gain by 
Mexico’s service industries (legal accounting, head offices, man-
agement consultancy activities (MEX45); other professional, 
scientific, technical, and veterinary activities (MEX49)) in the 
pre-fabrication stage. All these developments may have also 
contributed to the overall expansion of Mexico’s ICT value chain, 
as the entire length (x-axis) of this chain increased from 6.8 to 8.3 
between 2000 and 2014.
Japan’s final auto (JPN20) products exports-related value 
chain also experienced a dramatic change from a smile curve to 
an inverted smile curve-a frown from 2000 to 2014 (Figure 1.14). 
To some extent, this may have reflected the successful transition 
of Japan’s auto industry from traditional mass producer to mass 
customizer, based on digital technology and artificial intelli-
gence, similar to what happened in German’s auto industry (as 
reported in the 2017 GVC Development Report). The mass cus-
tomized manufacturing stage accounted for a relatively large 
portion of the total value gain, while the traditional high-end 
design and sales functions accounted for only a small portion 
of total value-added creation, mostly by producers from foreign 
countries. This is contrary to the typical intuition from the smile 
curve, in which traditional manufacturing stands only at the low 
end of the value chain, such as Mexico’s ICT final goods exports 
in 2000. But it could also reflect the ongoing structural change in 
GVCs, such as the emergence of the customer to manufacturing 
(C2M) business model in several industries. The most important 
changes between 2000 and 2014 were the increasing number 
and variation of foreign participants and the increasing length 
of the curve. In 2000, the United States and Germany dominated 
foreign participants upstream and downstream, while in 2014, 
more industries from foreign countries were involved, especially 
industries from China. This clearly reflects the increasing diversity 
and complexity of international fragmentation in Japan’s auto 
production. In addition, given the increase in labor compensa-
tion and absolute volume of value-added gain in Japan’s auto 
industry, along with the relatively low level of labor compensa-
tion of upstream and downstream participants from China, the 
slope of the entire curve became much steeper. This implies that 
Japan’s auto sector has enhanced its comparative advantage by 
outsourcing more upstream and downstream tasks that were for-
merly done by Japanese employees to China through GVCs.
3. The topology and structure change of GVC 
production and international trade11
Network analyses have been used widely to visually simplify the 
image of GVC activities given their increasing complexity (see 
Ferrarini, 2013; Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014; Zhou, 2016; Xiao et 
al., 2017). Unlike the literature in international trade-related net-
work analyses, we separate bilateral trade flows across countries 
into three types of networks (traditional trade networks, simple 
GVC networks and complex GVC networks) based on the pro-
duction activity decomposition method proposed by Wang et 
al. (2017) (see Box 1.2).12 The network analysis in this section 
provides a new view about how trade and production sharing 
activities are concentrated among bilateral trade partners, as 
well as the changing interdependency among trading partners 
in different networks. 
One conclusion of the network analysis, which covers 62 coun-
tries and 35 sectors from 2000 to 2017, is that the topology struc-
ture of networks (at the aggregate and individual sector levels) 
changes only gradually. Even the financial crisis of 2008 did not 
result in a significant change in the network topology in 2009. 
This implies that the structure of global production networks 
expressed by the topology of country to country relationships 
is resilient, even when economic shocks of a large magnitude hit 
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the global economy. Therefore, this analysis considers only the 
long-term change from 2000 to 2017.13 We consider both the 
networks for the aggregate economy (all goods and all services), 
as well as selected typical GVC sectors (textile, ICT, and ser-
vices) as examples.
3.1 Supply hubs of value-added trade
Supply hubs of value-added trade at the aggregate level
As shown in the upper-left part of Figure 1.15, the three large 
regional supply hubs in the traditional trade networks in 2000 
were the US, Germany and Japan. Obviously, these three hubs 
have very important linkages with their neighbor countries. 
The US has strong linkages to its two North American part-
ners, Canada and Mexico, the two large Asian countries, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, and Brazil, India and Australia. 
Japan can also be considered as a regional supply hub in the 
Asia-Pacific region, since the US, China, the Republic of Korea, 
Chinese Taipei and many Asian countries have Japan as their 
most important value-added supplier through final product 
trade. Germany is the largest supply hub in the European area, 
because the majority of value-added imports in final products 
by almost all European countries is from Germany. When zoom-
ing in the figure, we can also find some small regional hubs in 
the European area, such as the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Bel-
gium, and Russia, and in the Asia-Pacific region, such as China, 
the Republic of Korea, India, Thailand, and Singapore, who have 
more than two linkages with other countries.
Comparing the situation of 2000 to that for 2017 (the upper-
right part of Figure 1.15), it seems there was no significant 
change in the network topology in Europe and North America, 
but dramatic changes occurred for Asia: China took over Japan’s 
position and became a global supply hub of value-added export 
through final products trade. China not only had important link-
ages with other hubs (the US and Germany), but also with its 
Asian neighbors (Japan, the Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei, 
and almost all Asian countries) and other emerging countries 
(Russia, Brazil, India). When comparing the magnitude of the 
value-added flows across countries over time, it is easy to see 
that the linkages between China and other main regional hubs 
as well as its surrounding countries became much thicker.
The middle-left part of Figure 1.15 shows the simple GVC 
trade networks for all goods and services in 2000. Compared 
to the traditional trade networks, the US was a global supply 
hub with important outflow linkages to the other two regional 
hubs, Germany and Japan. Some remarkable differences can 
be observed within each region. For example, compared to the 
traditional trade networks, more extra-regional countries had 
the US as their main supplier of value added through simple 
GVC trade. This also reflects the fact that US intermediate prod-
ucts were greatly used as inputs for many countries to produce 
domestically-used final products. The UK, which was a sub-hub 
in Europe in the traditional trade networks, becomes a sub-hub 
with important linkage with the US in the simple GVC trade 
networks.
A remarkable structural change in the simple GVC trade net-
works occurred between 2000 and 2017 (the middle-right part 
of Figure 1.15). In 2017 there was no longer any important link-
age between any two hubs, as simple GVC activities became 
more concentrated within Europe, North America and Asia. The 
US and Germany connected to each other indirectly through 
the Netherlands. The number of countries with strong linkages 
to the US decreased dramatically, as most of the surrounding 
linkages moved to China. Germany maintained its position as 
a regional supply hub in Europe with strong linkages to more 
countries. China replaced Japan and part of the US position 
and became the second largest supply hub in terms of both the 
magnitude of its value-added exports and the number of strong 
linkages to other countries.
Looking at the evolution of the complex GVC trade networks 
from 2000 to 2017 (see the bottom panel of Figure 1.15), trade 
became more concentrated among regional trading partners, 
and there was no important direct linkage among regional hubs. 
BOX 1.2
How network graphs are drawn in our GVC analysis
We draw two types of networks from ADB ICIO data to 
identify the hubs of various networks from importer and 
exporter perspectives. One takes a specific country as a 
supply hub if the majority of the imports by most countries 
in the network is from that country. Another takes a spe-
cific country as a demand hub if the majority of the exports 
from most countries in the network goes to that country. In 
our network figures, the size of the bubble represents the 
share of a country’s value-added exports or imports in total 
value-added exports or imports. The share of value-added 
flow between each trading partner in total value-added 
flow is represented by the thickness of the linkage. The 
arrow of the linkage shows the direction of the value-added 
flow. Two tests are used to determine whether a linkage 
line appears between trading patterns (taking the case of 
supply hub related networks as an example): 1) if country A 
takes the largest share in country B’s value-added imports, 
a linkage will be shown from A to B; or 2) if country A’s share 
in country B’s value-added imports is larger than 25%, a 
linkage will be shown from A to B. The first standard is the 
so-called “Top1” threshold widely used in network analyses 
to identify the most important linkages. The second stan-
dard is used to adjust the density of the network, in order to 
avoid losing other important linkages.14
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The US connected with Germany indirectly through two coun-
tries, Luxembourg and the UK. In addition, the volume of Chi-
na-made intermediates used as inputs for its downstream coun-
tries to further produce exporting products increased rapidly 
over the period as seen from the bubble size change for China.
Supply hubs of value-added trade in various networks for 
selected sectors
The topologies and changes in structure over time in individ-
ual sectors may differ considerably from the aggregate patterns 
shown above. Figure 1.16 shows the textile sector related networks. 
Obviously, there were many regional supply hubs in the traditional 
trade networks in 2000. There were three main regional supply 
hubs in Europe, Germany, Italy and the UK, who exported textile 
sector value-added to their trading partners through final goods 
trade. Germany and the UK connected indirectly through Turkey. 
India was also a sub-supply hub with inflow linkage from the UK 
and outflow linkages to Nepal and Bangladesh. The presence of 
Italy, as the most traditional country with strong fashion sectors, 
can be clearly identified in these networks. This is very different 
from the networks at the aggregated level shown in Figure 1.15, in 
which Italy’s presence in the textile sector is largely masked.
FIGURE 1.15 Supply hubs of trade in value-added in various networks at the aggregate level 
Traditional trade networks (all goods and services) 
Simple GVC trade networks (all goods and services) 
Complex GVC trade networks (all goods and services) 
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The structure of textile networks changed dramatically from 
2000 to 2017. China became the largest and the unique global 
supply hub; in the figure China has pushed away all the other 
regional hubs and surrounding countries to the periphery of the 
traditional trade networks. This phenomenon is consistent with 
the fact that textile final goods made in China can be found every-
where in the world. Mixed reasons may explain this phenomenon. 
China already had substantial textile production capacity in its 
early stage of development. Thus it easily joined GVCs by export-
ing more final textile products when tariff and non-tariff barriers 
decreased in other countries after its WTO accession. Moreover, 
China had a significant comparative advantage in exporting appar-
els, given its large labor force with lower wages, while FDI inflows 
from developed countries helped make China the largest exporter 
of textile and apparel products in the world. By 2017, China’s tex-
tile sector played a dominant role in traditional trade networks as 
well as the simple and complex GVC trade networks. This implies 
that China is gradually upgrading its textile sector, and thus can 
export more intermediates to other countries through GVC trade. 
Although China has grown to become a new rival in GVC trade 
through upgrading of intermediate exports of textile, Italy can still 
maintain its position as a regional hub especially in the complex 
FIGURE 1.16 Supply hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the textile sector
Traditional trade networks (textile sector)
Simple GVC trade networks (textile sector)
Complex GVC trade networks (textile sector)
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GVC trade networks. This indirectly reflects the strength of Italy’s 
technology in producing complex textile products compared to 
other European countries whose presences have declined in com-
plex GVC trade networks over time. 
The network topology for ICT experienced dramatic changes 
from 2000 to 2017 (Figure 1.17 shows the ICT sector’s val-
ue-added exports related networks). In 2017, China took over 
Japan’s position, becoming a global supply hub in both tradi-
tional trade and simple GVC networks. Inside Asia in 2017, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei played very important 
roles as sub-hubs. The US became a largely regional supply hub, 
keeping just important linkages with a limited number of coun-
tries. Japan’s presence decreased dramatically, as it moved from 
a global supply hub in the traditional trade networks and regional 
supply hub in the simple GVC networks in 2000 to the periph-
ery of the Asia-Pacific region in 2017. These changes reflect the 
so-called industrial hollowing15 out in the US and Japan’s ICT 
sectors (especially for final goods production), accompanied by 
large scale FDI from these countries to China. The latter made an 
important contribution to China’s ICT development, since even 
in recent years more than half of China’s ICT exports were pro-
duced by foreign-owned enterprises. 
FIGURE 1.17 Supply hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the ICT sector
Traditional trade networks (ICT sector)
Simple GVC trade networks (ICT sector)
Complex GVC trade networks (ICT sector)
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Nevertheless, the US and Japan remained important hubs 
in complex GVC networks in 2017, in terms of both the volume 
of value added traded and the number of countries with strong 
linkages. The US and Japan were still the main suppliers of com-
plex intermediate goods used by downstream countries through 
complex GVC activities. At the same time, China’s ICT sector 
exported more value added through both simple and complex 
GVC trades. This provides some evidence of the ongoing indus-
trial upgrading in China’s ICT industries, since more intermediate 
products have been made in China.
The US was the largest supply hub for services in 2000 in the 
traditional trade networks (Figure 1.18 shows the services sec-
tor’s value-added exports related networks). The US had sig-
nificant outflow linkages to Canada and Japan, and indirectly 
connected with the other supply hub, Germany, through third 
countries (Ireland and the UK) in 2000. In 2017, however, the US 
had few direct outflow linkages going to Asia. In 2017, Germany 
maintained its presence as a regional supply hub with import-
ant linkages to other sub-regional hubs (France and Italy), lost its 
linkage with the sub-regional hub Russia, and added a linkage 
FIGURE 1.18 Supply hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the services sector
Traditional trade networks (services sector)
Simple GVC trade networks (services sector)
Complex GVC trade networks (services sector)
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with the new sub-regional hub, Poland, in Europe. China took 
over Japan’s position in Asia and became a large supply hub with 
an important presence in exporting service sector value added 
to the US and other Asian economies in the traditional trade net-
works. While China did not export a large amount of services to 
the global market directly, China was the largest manufacturing 
final goods exporter and the value added of China’s domestic 
services were embodied in these exports.
In the simple GVC trade networks, the US maintained its role 
as the largest supply hub in 2017, but lost some important trading 
partners, such as the UK (which joined the European networks as 
a sub-supply hub), as well as Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Hong Kong, China (which have joined the Asia networks as sub-
hubs surrounding China). There was no longer any direct link-
age between the US and Germany in 2017, but they indirectly 
linked to each other through the Netherlands. China took over 
Japan’s role, becoming a regional supply hub with an important 
inflow linkage from the US and outflow linkages to other Asian 
economies. This implies that China’s services sector directly 
and indirectly exported value added to other Asian economies 
FIGURE 1.19 Demand hubs of trade in value-added in various networks at the aggregate level
Traditional trade networks (all goods and services)
Simple GVC trade networks (all goods and services)
Complex GVC trade networks (all goods and services)
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used to produce final goods. However, China still largely relied 
on US-made intermediate services when producing domestically- 
used final goods.
A very similar pattern can also be found in the complex GVC 
trade networks. One difference is that Germany’s services sector 
had a much larger presence in exporting value added through 
multiple cross-border transactions of intermediate goods in 
GVCs. This is probably due to the following fact: Germany has a 
high comparative advantage in exporting high-tech and complex 
intermediate goods, which embody value added from the domes-
tic services sector, since producing these high-tech intermediate 
exports requires inputs from the domestic services sectors, such 
as business supporting services and financial intermediaries. 
3.2 Demand hubs of value-added trade in various networks
Demand hubs of value-added trade in various networks at the 
aggregate level
The US was the unique global import demand hub in 2000, with 
connections to several Asia Pacific economies and some Euro-
pean counties, and stronger linkages with the regional demand 
hubs of Germany, the UK and Japan (upper part of Figure 1.19). 
The structure didn’t change greatly in 2017, except for the dra-
matic rise of China as a new regional demand hub in Asia with 
the strongest outflow linkage to the US. A similar pattern can be 
seen in the change in the simple GVC trade networks (the middle 
part of Figure 1.19) from 2000 to 2017, except that China became 
a regional demand hub with more inflow linkages from Asian 
FIGURE 1.20 Demand hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the textile sector
Traditional trade networks (textile sector)
Simple GVC trade networks (textile sector)
Complex GVC trade networks (textile sector)
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economies, as well as from some emerging countries outside Asia 
(Russia and Brazil). However, there was no global demand hub 
in the complex GVC trade networks (the bottom part of Figure 
1.19) in either 2000 or 2017, as GVC imports of Germany, the US 
and China were concentrated with their regional trading partners. 
Germany’s presence increased by 2017 to larger than that of the 
US, and China expanded rapidly. The US only maintained import-
ant linkages with its two regional partners, Canada and Mexico.
 All the above observations imply that the more complex the 
network, the more concentrated the cross-border transactions of 
intermediate goods in GVCs. In other words, geographic distance 
still matters in globally fragmented production, especially in com-
plex GVCs. This is because regional trade agreements recently have 
made greater progress than WTO negotiations in reducing the trans-
action costs, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers, involved in each 
border crossing. At the same time, regional trade agreements also 
follow rules-of-origin which likely promote complex GVC activities. 
Demand hubs of value-added trade in various networks for 
selected sectors
Greater variation in the structural change in networks can be 
found at the sector level. In the textile sector, the volume of 
FIGURE 1.21 Demand hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the ICT sector
Traditional trade networks (ICT sector)
2000 2017
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China’s trade increased sharply from 2000 to 2017, but its only 
important outflow linkage was to the US (Figure 1.20). Germany’s 
presence as a regional demand hub fell from 2000 to 2017, while 
Russia became an important regional demand hub in Europe with 
inflow linkages from some Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries. In the simple GVC networks, China’s importance as a 
regional demand hub increased, with an important outflow link-
age to the US and inflow linkages from most Asian economies. On 
the other hand, Italy changed from the largest regional demand 
hub in Europe to an isolated country, as Italy’s participation pat-
tern in simple GVCs changed from an intermediate goods-ori-
ented importer to an intermediate goods-oriented exporter. In 
the complex GVC networks, the connection in Europe, Asia and 
North America became more concentrated with their regional 
partners. The importance of France, Turkey and Viet Nam as 
sub-regional demand hubs increased substantially by 2017. Com-
pared to the position in simple GVC trade networks, Russia’s pres-
ence was very low in the complex GVC trade networks. 
In the ICT sector, China became the largest demand hub for the 
traditional trade networks. In 2017, China had the largest magni-
tude of imports (indicated by the size of the circle) and important 
inflow linkages from Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Chi-
nese Taipei, and outflow linkages to the US (Figure 1.21). A very 
similar pattern for China can also be found in the simple GVC trade 
FIGURE 1.22 Demand hubs of trade in value-added in various networks for the services sector
Traditional trade networks (services sector)
Simple GVC trade networks (services sector)
Complex GVC trade networks (services sector)
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networks. By 2017 the US had lost many inflow linkages from Asia, 
but still maintained many inflow linkages from other economies in 
the simple GVC trade networks. In the complex GVC trade net-
works, Europe, Asia and North America had become more sepa-
rated, as there was no longer any direct or indirect linkage among 
the regional hubs Germany, China and the US. Europe changed 
from multi-hubs to a single hub type network, while Asia changed 
from a single hub to a multi-hub type network. 
The most important structural change in the services sector was 
the rise of China, which in 2017 became a regional demand hub 
in all three networks (Figure 1.22). The US was still the only global 
demand hub in services for both traditional and simple GVC trade 
networks. The complex GVC trade networks are largely separated, 
since there was no direct linkage among regional hubs in both 
2000 and 2017. Germany’s presence in the complex GVC trade 
networks had increased by 2017, reflecting the significant depen-
dence of most European countries’ services sectors on German 
demand for intermediate imports. 
From the perspective of global production networks, we can see 
that the rise of China has dramatically changed the whole topology 
of GVCs from both the demand and supply sides at both the aggre-
gated and individual sector levels. This clearly reflects the fact that 
China is no longer just a “factory” exporting huge amounts of final 
goods to the world; China has emerged as a new “superpower” 
through rapid industrial upgrading, which is reflected in the large 
scale of its exports and imports of intermediate goods and services 
via both simple and complex GVC trade networks. In other words, 
more countries, especially in Asia, have become highly dependent 
on China’s supply of value-added and its demand for value-added 
directly and indirectly via GVCs. Another interesting finding that 
is not so remarkable, but can be clearly observed in our results, is 
that most of China’s final demand in the past was previously satis-
fied by its own domestic suppliers, whereas nowadays imports play 
a greater role in meeting this demand. Because of this and due 
to China’s rapid increase in purchasing power, China has become 
one of the most important demanders of value-added through 
final goods trade for several other countries. While China’s per 
capita GDP is still lower than most developed countries (US$8,827 
for China versus US$59,532 for the US in 2017 according to data 
from the World Bank Group), given China’s potential for positive 
economic growth, the ongoing process of further opening-up, and 
its large population size, it is not difficult to imagine that China will 
become an important demand hub even in traditional trade net-
works as a large buyer of final goods in the near future. No doubt, 
this will also significantly change the world map of economic inter-
dependence, as well as the distribution pattern of countries’ influ-
ential power in many senses.
4. The multilateral nature of bilateral trade 
balances in the age of GVCs16
Discussions of the US trade deficit in the press often focus on the 
aggregate deficit. The US has run huge trade deficits in manufac-
turing products, but has enjoyed a trade surplus in agricultural 
products and services (Figure 1.23). The US trade deficit in man-
ufacturing products increased sharply in the late 1990s, acceler-
ated after China joined the WTO in 2001, and further widened a 
few years after the global financial crisis.
The dramatic increase in the U.S. manufacturing trade defi-
cit with China since China’s WTO accession is largely a result of 
the movement of production facilities from other industrialized 
countries (mainly Japan and the Asian NICs) to China (Table 1.3 
reports the share of U.S. major trading partners’ contribution to 
the U.S. trade deficit in manufactured products between 1990 
and 2017). For example, in 1990, Japan and the four Asian Tigers 
FIGURE 1.23 United States worldwide trade balance in broad economic sectors 
% GDP 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
20
14
 
20
15
 
20
16
 
20
17
 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Service 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, available online at https://www.bea.gov/ 
36 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
TABLE 1.3 Share of U.S. trade deficit in manufacturing products with partners
(percent)
CAN JPN Four Asian NICs DEU MEX ASEAN9 CHN
Rest of 
OECD ROW G7
1990 7.5 49.4 25.7 10.2 -1.9 6.1 10.3 -6.7 -0.5 70.4
1995 6.7 45.3 10.8 10.0 5.7 13.1 24.2 -6.0 -9.8 66.9
2000 6.2 24.9 9.1 8.3 3.6 11.5 25.5 7.3 3.7 45.1
2005 4.1 15.1 3.7 8.5 4.2 9.4 37.0 12.9 5.1 34.3
2008 -2.2 16.5 1.6 8.6 5.8 11.1 57.6 9.2 -8.2 31.0
2009 -7.0 14.6 1.7 8.0 6.8 13.0 70.5 7.9 -15.5 21.7
2010 -5.9 15.1 -0.2 7.9 8.1 11.0 67.1 9.7 -12.8 22.9
2011 -7.5 15.0 -0.2 10.4 6.1 11.1 67.6 9.0 -11.5 23.4
2012 -8.6 16.9 0.1 12.2 5.6 11.7 70.6 7.3 -16.0 27.0
2013 -9.5 16.4 -1.4 13.8 5.2 12.8 72.6 8.5 -18.4 28.4
2014 -8.4 13.5 0.4 13.2 5.2 13.6 67.7 11.0 -16.2 25.5
2015 -5.1 11.2 1.7 11.1 7.3 13.6 59.5 11.3 -10.5 23.5
2016 -4.5 11.0 1.9 9.2 8.2 14.3 55.4 11.9 -7.4 21.4
2017 -4.7 10.5 1.2 8.5 8.1 14.7 56.1 12.8 -7.2 20.1
Data Source: OECD Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use (BTDI*E), ISIC, Rev.4, available online: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BT-
DIXE_I4. ASEAN 9 include MYS, PHL, THA, IDN, VNM, BRN, KHM, MMR and LAO. SGP is included in Four Asian NICs.
BOX 1.3
Identifying and measuring the third country effect in bilateral trade
An integrated mathematical framework to trace value added 
and identify double counted items in gross trade flows is pro-
vided in Koopman, Wang and Wei (KWW, 2014). A country’s 
gross exports can be decomposed into the sum of four con-
ceptually different components: (a) domestic value added 
that is ultimately absorbed abroad, or value-added exports 
(VAX) as named by Johnson and Noguera (2012); (b) domes-
tic value added that is exported (as intermediate exports) 
and then returned home (RDV); (c) foreign value added used 
in the production of exports (FVA); and (d) multiple counted 
value added due to back and forth cross-border intermedi-
ate trade (PDC). KWW further shows that these components 
of gross exports all have specific types of relationships with 
GDP statistics: VAX is the home country’s GDP used to sat-
isfy foreign demand, in which the factor content embodied 
in gross exports crosses national borders at least once; RDV 
is not part of home country’s value added exports, but is 
part of home country’s GDP that is eventually absorbed at 
home as the country’s final demand, through which domes-
tic factor content crosses national borders at least twice; 
FVA is a part of other countries’ GDP, or the factor content 
in exports that also crosses national borders at least twice; 
PDC counts in no country’s GDP, as it is the factor content 
that has already been counted by at least one of the three 
components above and crosses national borders at least 
three times but is recorded in gross trade statistics by each 
country’s custom authority. 
By identifying which parts of the gross trade transac-
tions are double counted relative to GDP statistics, the 
KWW method provides a way to correctly interpret gross 
trade data in value added terms (relative to GDP) and links 
gross trade and GDP statistics (the two most important 
and popular used economic statistics today) based on the 
System of National Accounts standard (SNA). Wang, Wei, 
and Zhu (2014) extend the KWW accounting framework 
to trade at the bilateral, sector, and bilateral sector levels 
and provide a consistent accounting framework that resem-
bles in spirit that of KWW (2014) across different levels of 
aggregation. By splitting these four broad components into 
more detailed items, the roles of third countries in bilateral 
trade can be clearly identified and measured, as indicated 
by Table 1.4.
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BOX 1.3 (continued)
Identifying and measuring the third country effect in bilateral trade
The decomposition of bilateral trade at a detailed level 
shows that the role of third countries in bilateral trade can 
be measured by 3 of the 8 detailed components (in blue 
font): DVA_IND, OVA and ODC. The ratio of DVA_IND to 
gross trade is used to measure the importance of a part-
ner country as a transfer platform for the home country’s 
DVA absorbed in third countries. This ratio is determined 
by the production sharing arrangement between the 
home and partner country, as well as by final demand in 
third countries. Similarly, the ratio of OVA to gross trade 
is used to measure the importance of third countries’ 
factor content for the home country’s export production. 
This ratio is driven by final demand in the partner coun-
try and the production sharing arrangement between 
the home and third countries. Finally, the ratio of ODC 
to gross trade is used to measure the complexity of the 
third-country effect. This ratio is determined by the pro-
duction arrangement among home, partner and third 
countries. ODC refers only to intermediate inputs that 
cross a national border at least three times (a firm uses 
intermediate inputs from a country to produce intermedi-
ate inputs in another country for production of exports to 
a third country, involving production sharing activities of 
at least among 3 countries). 
TABLE 1.4 Decomposition of bilateral gross trade to identify and measure the roles of third counties in bilateral trade
(percent)
Core KWW 
decomposition Detailed Decomposition Economic interpretation
Relation to GDP 
statistics
Number of border 
crossings
VAX_G
Value added exports
DVA_DIR Domestic VA in 
production of exports 
that is finally absorbed by 
trading partner 
Home GDP satisfies 
final demand in partner 
country At least once
DVA_IND Domestic VA in 
production of exports 
that is finally absorbed by 
third countries 
Home GDP satisfies final 
demand in third countries
At least twice
RDV_G
Returned DVA
RDV_G Domestic VA first 
exported but finally 
returned home and 
consumed there
Home GDP satisfies own 
domestic final demand 
through international 
trade
FVA
Foreign value added
MVA Trading partner’s VA 
used in production of 
exports that return to and 
is absorbed by partner
Partner’s GDP satisfies 
final demand in partner 
country
OVA Third countries’ VA used 
in production of exports 
that is finally absorbed by 
partner
Third countries’ GDP 
satisfies final demand in 
partner country
PDC
Pure double counting 
ODC Pure double counting in 
gross exports sourced 
from third countries
No country’s GDP
At least three times
DDC Pure double counting in 
gross exports sourced 
from home
No country’s GDP
MDC Pure double counting in 
gross exports sourced 
from partner
No country’s GDP
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were the source of about 75% of the U.S. worldwide trade deficit 
in manufactured products, but by 2017 their share had declined 
to less than 12%. Over the same period, China’s share of the U.S. 
trade deficit in manufacturing products increased dramatically 
from 10% to about 73% in 2013, and has declined since then. In 
other words, while China was becoming an increasingly import-
ant source of manufactured goods, the relative importance of 
the rest of the industrialized world as a whole was declining (see 
the last column of Table 1.3), because many firms in these econ-
omies were shifting their manufacturing and assembly facilities 
to China via their FDI to China. Trade statistics by ownership 
from China Customs confirm that China’s trade surplus in man-
ufacturing products with the US was mainly generated by wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises (FIE) and joint venture companies 
(JOV), although Chinese-owned private firms (PRI) have played 
an increasing role in recent years17.
Along with China, other emerging economies, such as Mexico 
and the ASEAN countries, have been increasingly integrated into 
global production networks over the last two decades and have 
increased their share of the US global trade deficit in manufac-
tured goods (Table 1.3). This suggests that the development of 
various global production chains is one of the fundamental driv-
ing forces of the growing U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China in 
manufactured products during the past two decades.
To examine the role GVCs have played in the geographical 
shifting of the US trade deficit in manufacturing products, this 
section analyzes the value-added structure of the three trade 
routes where the US has the largest deficit, namely US trade 
with China, Japan and Germany, using the gross trade account-
ing method proposed by Koopman et. al (2014, see Box 1.3 for 
details).
We first look at the value-added structure for US net imports 
of computer, electronic and optical equipment (OECD-ICIO C30, 
32 and 33) from China as an example. The decomposition results 
are reported in Table 1.5. Column (1) reports gross exports in 
millions of dollars (current prices). Column (2) reports value 
TABLE 1.5 US-China trade of computer, electronic and optical equipment
(million USD)
Year TEXP VAX_G DVA_DIR DVA_IND RDV_G DDC MC OVA ODC
(1)=2+3+4
+5+6+7
(2)=2a+2b (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
China exports to the United States
2000
Value 17,553 4,356 3,652 704 21 64 1,785 9,385 1,942
Share 100 24.8 20.8 4 0.1 0.4 10.2 53.5 11.1
2007
Value 94,153 33,869 29,826 4,043 195 1,003 6,229 47,502 5,356
Share 100 36 31.7 4.3 0.2 1.1 6.6 50.5 5.7
2014
Value 166,296 76,573 67,422 9,151 675 2,537 9,301 69,035 8,176
Share 100 46 40.5 5.5 0.4 1.5 5.6 41.5 4.9
US exports to China
2000
Value 5,362 3,441 2,504 936 572 139 46 725 440
Share 100 64.2 46.7 17.5 10.7 2.6 0.9 13.5 8.2
2007
Value 13,930 9,182 4,891 4,291 2,016 237 427 886 1,182
Share 100 65.9 35.1 30.8 14.5 1.7 3.1 6.4 8.5
2014
Value 25,054 18,544 11,099 7,445 3,346 317 754 1,033 1,061
Share 100 74 44.3 29.7 13.4 1.3 3.0 4.1 4.2
US net imports from China
2000
Value 12,191 915 1,148 -232 -551 -75 1,739 8,661 1,502
Share 100 7.5 9.4 -1.9 -4.5 -0.6 14.3 71.0 12.3 
2007
Value 80,223 24,687 24,935 -248 -1,821 765 5,802 46,616 4174
Share 100 30.8 31.1 -0.3 -2.3 1.0 7.2 58.1 5.2 
2014
Value 141,242 58,029 56,323 1,706 -2,671 2,220 8,547 68,002 7,114
Share 100 41.1 39.9 1.2 -1.9 1.6 6.1 48.1 5.0 
Source: The UIBE GVC indexes derived from the 2017 OECD ICIO table. 
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added exports (VAX_G) associated with these gross trade flows. 
In the next five columns, major components of gross exports 
are reported: domestic value added that is ultimately absorbed 
by partner country ((2a) DVA_DIR); domestic value added that 
is ultimately absorbed by third countries ((2b) DVA_IND), which 
depends upon final demand in the third country; domestic value 
added in exports that is ultimately returned and consumed at 
home (column (3) RDV_G), which is part of home country’s GDP 
and final demand; loop effects between bilateral trading part-
ners (Column (4) and (5) DDC and MC), third countries’ value 
added in gross exports (column (6), OVA) and pure double 
counting sourced from third countries (column (7), ODC).
The decomposition results not only reveal the mislead-
ing nature of the balance of trade computed from gross trade 
statistics, but also the sources of such statistical illusion. Value 
added in exports (VAX_G) accounted for only 25% of China’s 
exports of computer, electronic and optical equipment to the 
US before China’s WTO accession. This share increased after-
wards, but remained lower than 50% in 2014. The value added 
in exports from third countries consistently accounted for more 
than 50% of China’s exports of these goods throughout the 
sample period. The composition of US exports to China was 
the opposite, as the share of VAX_G dominated throughout the 
sample period (between 65-75%). The value added content from 
third countries (OVA+ODC) accounted for less than 20% of US 
gross exports of these goods, and declined to only about 8% in 
2014. MC+OVA+ODC accounts for the largest portion of China’s 
exports, as China used upstream inputs from the US and third 
countries to produce its exports; DVA_IND+RDV+DDC is the 
largest portion of US exports, which are US products imported 
by China used as inputs to produce China’s exports for US and 
third country markets. Therefore, the main source of the trade 
imbalance in China-US bilateral trade in computer, electronic 
and optical equipment was the third countries’ value added in 
gross trade flows. Third countries accounted for 80.3% of the 
total trade imbalance in 2000, falling to 53.1% in 2014.
Bilateral trade balances (net imports) are often used by trade 
and labor economists as a measure of import penetration and 
the impact of external trade on domestic economic activity. 
When traditional (final goods) trade dominated international 
trade flows, the net imports captured the imported factor con-
tent from the surplus economy to the deficit economy. However, 
when global trade is dominated by global value chains, gross 
trade balance is no longer a reliable measure of import penetra-
tion. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.5, US net imports 
of computer, electronic and optical equipment only contain a 
very small portion of Chinese factor content. In 2000, Chinese 
value added (factor content) only constituted 7.5% of US total net 
imports from China. This share increased rapidly after China join 
the WTO, reaching 30.8% in 2007 and 41.1% in 2014.
Differences in the value-added structure of exports between 
China and the US reflects the different role that the two coun-
tries’ firms played in this sector. With high design and system 
integration capacities, US multinationals were the lead firms of 
global value chains and occupied a top and central position in 
the global production network. By contrast, Chinese firms began 
to join the global value chains since deregulation of foreign 
investment in 1992, undertaking processing and assembly tasks, 
so that the ratio of domestic value added to gross exports was 
very low; a great deal of value came from foreign upstream sup-
pliers of raw materials, parts and components. In 2000, 98.7% of 
China’s exports of computer, electronic and optical equipment to 
the US were processing exports. After China entered the WTO, 
Chinese firms started to move up the global value chains. More 
Chinese firms upgraded to general trade, and the proportion of 
processing trade fell (from 87.3% in 2007 to 77.4% in 2014).
Such a value-added structure of US net imports from China 
is not uncommon. The important role played by third countries 
also can be observed in US net imports from Germany, Japan 
and many other trading partners. Figure 1.24 shows the val-
ue-added structure of US total net imports from Germany. A 
much larger portion of US intermediate goods exports to Ger-
many were re-exported to third countries compared to the share 
of US imports from Germany (DVA_IND, which depends on final 
demand in third countries) that was re-exported. Thus, in this 
re-exported portion, the US actually ran a large surplus with 
Germany in terms of value added, especially in services sectors. 
Compared to US net imports from China, US net imports from 
Germany contain a much higher share of Germany’s factor con-
tent (around 80%), but third countries’ suppliers also accounted 
for around 40% (third countries’ final demand accounted for a 
negative 20%, implying that Germany’s imports from the US 
depended more on third countries’ final demand for Germany’s 
products that use US intermediate inputs). All of this demon-
strates the complex composition and offsetting factors involved 
in gross net trade flows.
To further demonstrate the differing roles of third countries 
across bilateral trade routes, Figure 1.25 compares the changing 
value-added structure of: US net imports of computer, electronic 
and optical equipment from China and US net imports of trans-
port and storage services from Germany; and US net imports of 
motor vehicles from Germany and Japan.
US net imports of ICT products from China increased rapidly 
after China joined the WTO, jumping from less than 10% of US 
sector value-added (11 billion USD) in 2001 (right scale of Figure 
1.25, top left) to over 60% (141 billion USD) in 2014. Factor content 
from third countries played the most important role in this dramatic 
growth (well above 50%). This reflected other countries using China 
as an assembling hub to re-export their domestic value added to 
satisfy US final demand. Similarly, demand for German goods by 
third countries, mostly nearby European economies, were the driv-
ing force behind the rise in US net exports of transport and storage 
services to Germany (Figure 1.25, bottom left).
Third countries’ production significantly affected US deficits 
in motor vehicles with Germany and Japan from 1995 to 2014. A 
substantial portion of US net imports from Germany (more than 
one fourth of US net imports in 2014) reflected factor content 
from third countries, mostly Eastern EU countries and China, 
while final demand in third countries accounted for only about 
5% of US net imports over this period (Figure 1.25, bottom right). 
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The importance of third countries’ factor content supply and 
final demand in US net imports of motor vehicles from Japan 
increased towards the end of this period, but remained at a 
lower level than in Germany.
This analysis illustrates that in the age of global value chains, 
when embodied factor content and sources of final demand of 
gross trade flows vary significantly across trade routes by coun-
tries and products, net bilateral imports are no longer a reliable 
measure of the impact of trade with a partner country on domes-
tic prices and wages. This also implies that any change in bilateral 
trade policy can have a significant impact on third countries that 
should not be overlooked in dealing with bilateral trade issues.
5. Conclusions
The rise of GVCs has significantly changed the nature and struc-
ture of the world economy. The increasing complexity of GVCs 
also brings great challenges to policy making in both developed 
and developing countries. This chapter has presented trends 
in GVC production and trade up to 2017 from various perspec-
tives, based on a recently developed production decomposition 
method that classifies factor contents embodied in a product 
into GVC and non-GVC activities depending on whether they 
cross national borders. 
Several findings emerge from this chapter:
First, the globalization of production slowed after 2011, indi-
cated by the increase of purely domestic production and the 
decline of GVC activities as a share of total production activities. 
As the growth of global trade surpassed the growth of global 
GDP for the first time in nearly six years, there were some signs 
of recovery of GVC activities in 2017, especially for complex 
GVCs activities. However, 10 years after the global financial crisis, 
global GVC participation has not returned to the pre-crisis level. 
Considering a longer period, the higher technology (knowledge) 
intensity of a sector, the more significant the increase of complex 
GVC activities. 
Second, while the share of intra-regional GVC activities in 
total GVC activities increased in Asia from 2000 to 2017, the 
share of intra-regional GVC activities declined in both Europe 
and North America and their share of inter-regional production 
sharing activities increased, especially their GVC linkages with 
“Factory Asia”. GVC trade become more global in 2017 compare 
to 2000.
Third, from the view of global production network topology, 
China played an increasingly important role as both a supply and 
demand hub in traditional trade and simple GVC activities, while 
the US and Germany remained the most important hubs in com-
plex GVC networks. China has emerged as a new hub through 
rapid industrial upgrading, represented by its more high-tech 
FIGURE 1.24 Value-added structure of US net imports from Germany
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Source: The UIBE GVC indexes derived from the 2017 OECD ICIO tables.
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intermediate exports and imports. Bilateral trade, especially 
complex GVC trade, became more concentrated among major 
regional trading partners, indicating distance matters even for 
value-added trade and GVCs.
Fourth, in the age of GVCs, bilateral trade balances are no 
longer a reliable measure of the impact of partner countries on 
domestic economic activities. For example, production and final 
demand from third countries have had a significant impact on 
US net imports from China, Germany and Japan. And factor con-
tent from third countries accounted for more than half of the bur-
geoning deficit in US net imports of ICT products from China, 
which increased 12.8 times in the 15 years up to 2014 to reach 
141 billion USD.
One important policy implication is that changes in trade 
policy can have broad and unanticipated effects. Unilateral 
imposition of trade protection on exports from a partner coun-
try can have a significant impact on third countries when trade is 
carried out through GVCs, particularly complex GVCs. Indeed, as 
many products today are already “made in the world”, increasing 
import protection can even harm exports from the home country. 
More policy analyses on the impact of technology changes and 
GVC trade on labor markets in developed and developing coun-
tries will be discussed in detail in other chapters of this report.
Current residence-based national account rules treat all firms 
within national borders as domestic firms, so the value-added 
creation of foreign affiliates is treated as part of purely domestic 
production activities if they do not engage in cross border trade. 
However, some of their production may also be a type of GVC 
activity, especially in services because the supply of services 
through commercial presence abroad is an important way of 
conducting international transactions in services (mode 3 – com-
mercial presence). The distinction between foreign and domestic 
owned firms is particularly relevant. However, no ICIO table cur-
rently available is able to separate production activities between 
domestic firms and foreign affiliates to allow us to develop GVC 
measurement for such activities. Initiatives in this direction are 
being taken in the international statistical community. Chapter 
8 of this report will discuss this and related GVC measurement 
issues in more details. 
FIGURE 1.25 The roles of third countries can be very different in different bilateral trading routes 
Share % Billions USD
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Notes
1. “Pure domestic” means domestic value-added in domestically pro-
duced final products that satisfy domestic final demand without 
involving cross border trade and production sharing activities, it can 
also be phrased as “not traded internationally”; “Traditional trade” 
is final goods and services produced for exports with only domestic 
factor content, it can also be phrased as “Trade in final products” or 
“Ricardian Trade”; “GVCs” are basically “trade in intermediate prod-
ucts”. The distinction between simple and complex GVC activities 
in our estimates are determined by the number of national border 
crossing, not the differences in technology or the complexity of actual 
production process (although there is a correlation between them), 
so they can be phrased as “value-added activities cross one or more 
than one national borders”. Some care is needed in interpretation, 
for example a large economy is likely to see lower levels of estimated 
complex GVCs than would be the case if the same economy was split 
into a series of smaller economies.
2. This section was written by Xin Li and Zhi Wang.
3. We aggregate the 65 WIOD industries into 8 industry groups: (1) 
AGR: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (ISIC rev.3 “01T05”); 
(2)Min: Mining and Quarrying (ISIC rev.3 “10T14”); (3) HTI: High R&D 
intensive industries (ISIC rev.3 “24, 29T34, 352,353, 359”);(4) MTI: 
Medium R&D intensive industries (ISIC rev.3 “25T28, 351, 37”); (5) LTI: 
low R&D intensive industries (ISIC rev.3 “15T23, 36”), (6) TTS: Trade 
and Transportation (ISIC rev.3 “50T52”, 55, “60T63”);(B)FBS Post and 
Telecommunications, Financial and Business services (ISIC rev.3 “64, 
65T67, 71T74”); (8) OSE: Real Estate Activities, Utility, Construction, 
and: other services (ISIC rev.3 “70, 75, 80, 85, 90T93, 95, 40,41, 45”).
4. The relative value of the forward and backward participation indi-
ces indicates a country-sector’s position in the global production 
network. A higher degree of forward participation than backward 
participation implies that the country is more actively engaged 
in upstream production activities in GVCs. Some care is needed in 
interpretation however, see Ahmad, N., et al. (2017), “Indicators on 
global value chains: A guide for empirical work”, OECD Statistics 
Working Papers, No. 2017/08, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.
org/10.1787/8502992f-en.
5. As a result, industry became an inappropriate analytical unit for the 
study of international trade. See the discussion on firm heterogeneity 
for the empirical challenges to tackle this problem in Chapter 8.
6. Its GVC exports share to Europe and Asia was 40.4% and 20.4% 
respectively, higher than its share of intra-regional complex GVC 
activities at 18.1%; Its complex GVC imports share from Europe and 
Asia was 31.2% and 27.8% respectively, also higher than its share of 
intra-regional complex GVC activities at only 20.7%,
7. This section was written by Bo Meng and Ming Ye.
8. Some care is needed in interpreting smile curves produced using 
input-output tables in basic prices, see also Chapter 8.
9. The data for compensation per employee is from the WIOD Socio 
Economic Accounts 2016 version (compensation of employees / 
number of employees).
10. The distance is measured by a value-added weighted average of pro-
duction stages. For detailed methodology, one can refer to Ye, Meng 
et.al. (2015).
11. This section was written by Bo Meng, Hao Xiao and Jiabai Ye.
12. Data are from the ADB ICIO database (the 2018 version).
13. It should be noted, these types of plots are better for capturing long-
run changes on the extensive margin rather than short-run changes 
that occur on the intensive margin.
14. It should be noted that country size may result in some bias in our 
analysis. For example, countries exporting to the US are more likely to 
see their exports classified as ‘simple’ than ‘complex’ GVC activities, 
compared to exports within a ‘fragmented’ region of smaller countries 
(e.g. EU).
15. A large number of studies have argued that due to rising manufac-
turing costs in developed nations, many companies are looking to 
less-developed nations to set up manufacturing facilities in hopes of 
reducing costs. These developed countries are being “hollowed out”, 
which poses a threat to many factory workers because they could 
lose their job to someone in another country. The level of industrial 
hollowing out can be measured by net FDI outflows, unemployment 
rates, the share of manufacturing industries in GDP, and other means.
16. This section was written by Fei Wang, Zhi Wang and Kunfu Zhu.
17. Based on trade statistics collected by the General Administration 
of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (GACC), China had a 
304.8 billion USD trade surplus in manufacturing products with the 
United States in 2017. The share of FIE and JOV was 55%, the share of 
PRI was 41%, while SOE and other firms represented only about 4%.
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